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Crimes committed by and for business
pose a serious threat to the health, safety,
and financial welfare of consumers and
workers as well as to the orderly functioning of the economy and the government.
Commonly known as corporate or organizational crimes, these offenses raise special
problems .for detection, prosecution, and
sanction. 1 Isolated efforts by individual
enforcement agencies have proven inadequate against this type of crime, underscoring the need for a coordinated,
multistrategy response from Federal,
State, and local levels of government.
Historically, the Federal Government has
assumed primary responsibility for controlling corporate crime, but in the past two
decades, local prosecutors have become
increasingly concerned about this problem.
In 1973 the National District Attorneys
Association established an Economic
Crime Committee to encourage local prosecutors to enforce white-collar crime laws
and to enhance their enforcement ability.
By 1975, 43 district attorneys' offices were
participating in the committee's Economic
Crime Project.

Since the Economic Crime Project was
begun nearly 20 years ago, local response to corporate white-collar crime
has changed significantly. In the past,
district attorneys concentrated almost
exclusively on economic crimes such as
consumer fraud. They are now prosecuting a wider variety of cases, including occupational safety violations and
the illegal dumping of toxic waste. In
nearly every State, prosecutors have
sought criminal indictments against
corporations, partnerships, and other
business entities for noneconomic
offenses.
This Research in Brief summarizes a
National Institute of Justice study of
local prosecutors' work against corporate crime. For the study, corporate
crime was defined as "a violation of a
criminal statute either by a corporate
entity or by its executives, employees,
or agents acting on behalf of and for the
benefit of the corporation, partnership,
or other form of business entity."

The first component of the study was a
mail survey of 632 district attorneys with
jurisdictions located in or near urban areas. 2 Completed questionnaires were received from 419 districts, a response rate
of 66 percent. The survey data were then
merged with economic, social , and official
crime data for each jurisdiction. 3 The second component of the study involved case
studies in four jurisdictions: Cook County,
Illinois; Los Angeles County, California;
Dade County, Florida; and Nassau County,
New York. In each jurisdiction prosecutors, regulatory officials, and representatives of various law enforcement agencies
were interviewed regarding their views of
corporate crime and their interactions with
other law enforcement agencies.

Trends In corporate crime
prosecutions
One conclusion is that local prosecution of
corporate crime is becoming more widespread. More than one-quarter of the survey respondents said that corporate
prosecutions have increased during their
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Local prosecutions of corporate crime,
particularly crimes against the environment
and consumer fraud, are becoming more
widespread. Six out of 10 local prosecutors
who responded to a recent National Institute
of Justice survey reported increased numbers of corporate prosecutions by their
offices.
Once confined almost entirely to the Federal courts, local prosecutions of corporate
crimes have increased steadily since the
Economic Crime Project was established in
1975 by the Economic Crime Committee of

the National District Attorneys Association.
As this NIJ Research in Brief points out,
local district attorneys are now taking
corporate defendants to court for a growing
variety of offenses, including occupational
safety violations and the illegal dumping of
toxic waste.
Local prosecutions of corporate offenders
are not undertaken easily; as this report
shows, the complex, often technical nature
of crimes committed in an organizational
setting can make them both costly and
difficult to prosecute. And because

successful prosecutions often require substantial time and labor, the availability of
resources plays a significant role in local
activity against corporate crime.
In addition to reporting on the results of the
survey, this Institute report offers suggestions
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tenure in office. One-quarter reported that
they expected to prosecute more corporate
cases in the future. Less than 1 percent
had seen or anticipated a decrease in
prosecutions.

e Only one type of noneconomic crimeenvironmental offenses-was prosecuted
as often as economic crime. In 1988, 31
percent of the offices handled at least one
environmental offense.

Prosecutors in large jurisdictions (those
with populations over 250,000) most frequently reported increased rates of corporate prosecutions. Roughly 6 out of 10
respondents in large jurisdictions said
prosecutions had increased during their
tenures in office, and a majority expected
this trend to continue.

Most districts did not have data on the
specific number of corporate offenses
handled in 1988. For this reason, the prevalence of local corporate crime prosecutions can only be approximated (table 2).

Prevalence of corporate
crime prosecutions
In 1988 two-thirds of the survey respondents said their offices prosecuted at least
one of nine types of corporate crime (table
1). Although local prosecutors handled a
wider variety of corporate crimes in 1988
than in previous years, economic crimes
still made up the bulk of their corporate
crime caseload.

e Consumer fraud was the most frequently prosecuted corporate offense, with 41
percent of the offices prosecuting at least
one case of consumer fraud.
• False claims and insurance fraud followed as the most frequently prosecuted
economic crimes, with 31 percent of the
offices prosecuting at least one offense in
these categories.

• Typically, 15 percent ofthe districts
handled more than three consumer fraud
cases a year, while 20 percent of the districts handled one to three annually.

e About 10 percent of local prosecutors
typically handled more than three false
claims, insurance fraud cases, or environmental offenses per year.
Prosecutors in the case study sites reported
that most of their resources were allocated
to combat economic offenses, but noted
that environmental offenses were becoming more prevalent. As one prosecutor
said, "The danger from this environmental
stuff is much greater than what we have to
worry about from drugs." Another noted,
· "A day does not go by without my hearing
about some type of environmental issue on
television or in the newspapers. The problems are immense."

Tablet. Percentage of Offices Prosecuting Selected Corporate
Crimes In 1988*

Corporate crime
Consumer fraud
Securities fraud
Insurance fraud
Tax fraud
False claims
Workplace offenses
Environmental offenses
Illegal payments
Unfair trade practices
Any corporate offense

Yes

No

41%
22
31
16
31
11
31
16
8
66

59%
78
69
84
69
89
69
84
92
34

• In 1988, did your office actually prosecute any of the following corporate offenses?

2

Variation In local corporate
crime prosecution
Because of their complex, technical nature,
crimes committed in an organizational
setting can be difficult to prosecute. Statistical analysis revealed three significant
causes for local variations in corporate
crime prosecution: availability of resources, community context, and regional
differences. These all affected how aggressive local prosecutors were in responding to corporate crime.
Availability of resources. Because successful prosecutions often require substantial time and labor, the availability of
resources has a significant influence on
local activity against corporate crime.
Large offices (as measured by the number
of full-time attorneys) conducted more
corporate prosecutions than small offices.
Those offices that had joined an interagency task force to combat white-collar
or economic crime or had established a
special unit tended to be more active than
offices lacking such arrangements.
Community context. The economic,
demographic, and social makeup of the
community also plays a significant role in
determining the aggressiveness of local
corporate crime prosecution. In the study,
community context affected local prosecutors' attention and reaction to certain types
of offenses. For example, prosecutors in
Nassau County, New York, cited illegal
disposal of medical waste as a significant
environmental problem, while prosecutors
in Cook County, Illinois, cited illegal disposal or abandonment of toxic chemicals
by defunct metal-plating businesses as a
typical problem. Local prosecutors tended
to be sensitive to the specific problems,
needs, and expectations of the communities in which they worked, much as are
local police forces.
Regional differences. Regional differences also affect the amount of local activity taken against corporate crime. In
general, prosecutors in western States
tended to be more active against most
forms of corporate crime than their counterparts in northeastern, midwestern, and
southern States (table 3). Compared to
offices in other regions, a larger percentage
of western offices typically handled more .
than three cases per year of most corporate
crimes.

and representatives from Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies.

Table 2. Frequency of Prosecutions In a Typical Year*

• Creating special units for economic
crimes, which allows prosecutors to
develop the technical and legal expertise
necessary to handle complex cases by concentrating on these types of crimes.

Frequency

Corporate crime
Consumer fraud
Securities fraud
Insurance fraud
Tax fraud
False claims
Workplace offenses
Environmental offenses
Illegal payments
Unfair trade practices

Never
32%

Fewer than
1 case
per year

About
1-3 cases
per year

33%

20%

More than
3 cases
per year

This survey found that 24 percent of local
prosecutors were using one or the other (or
both) of these special control strategies.

15%

57

28

12

3

38

39

15

9

61

25

8

6

40

34

15

11

68

25

5

1

45

34

13

8

51

37

10

2

75

18

3

5

• Twenty-three percent of the respondents had a special in-house unit in their
office for investigating and prosecuting
economic or white-collar crimes.
• Eight percent were involved in an
interagency task force or strike group focusing on economic or white-collar crime.
• Of those involved in an interagency
task force, 75 percent also had a special
unit.

*Typically, how often does your office prosecute the corporate criminal offenses listed
below?

The higher level of activity among prosecutors in the West may be due to the
types of offices and communities they
-;erve. First, the western offices sampled
#ere located in districts with comparatively large populations. Along with their
greater population size, these districts may
have more business activity, and therefore,
more potential offenses than districts in
other regions. Second, the western offices
tended to have more attorneys and investigators than offices in other regions. Third,
legal or cultural factors unique to western
States may cause local prosecutors to take
a comparatively more vigorous approach
to corporate crime. However, the true
cause of regional variation remains uncl~ar
and deserves further investigation.4

The Economic Crime Project discovered
two ways for local prosecutors to augment
resources and increase efficiency against
corporate crime:

District attorneys learned about corporate
misconduct through a variety of official
and unofficial sources. Most often, cases
came to the attention of prosecutors after
complaints by business and citizen victims.
The second most common sources were
the local police and State regulatory
agencies, followed by the State police and
State attorney general's offices. Federal
1w enforcement and regulatory agencies
did not refer many cases to local prosecutors (table 4).

• Fourteen of the 30 largest offices were
involved in an interagency task force,
compared to only one of the 30 smallest
offices.

• Using interagency teams to analyze,
investigate, and prosecute complex whitecollar crimes. These networks typically
include prosecutors; regulatory officials;

• More than 70 percent of the respondents in large jurisdictions used one or more

Table 3. Percentage of Offices Prosecuting More Than Three
Cases per Year, by Region*

Crime

Discovery of corporate
offenses

The use of special control strategies varied
by size of district and region of the country
and was more prevalent in large jurisdictions than in small ones.

Networking and special units

South

Consumer fraud
Securities fraud
Insurance fraud
Tax fraud
False claims
Workplace offenses
Environmental offenses
Illegal payments
Unfair trade practices

Region
West Northeast Midwest

11%

42%

16%

9%

3

9

2

3

8

15

13

6

7

9

2

5

9

30

12

7

3

2

0

0

3

33

9

6

2

5

2

0

2

2

28

• Typically, how often does your office prosecute the corporate criminal offenses listed
below?

3

Constraints on prosecutorial ·
discretion

Table 4. Frequency of Referrals From Selected Sources*

Frequency

Referral source
Local police
State police
State attorney general
State regulatory agency
Federal regulatory agency
U.S. Attorney's Office
FBI
Business victims
Citizen victims
Public interest groups

Never

25%
41
40
28
71
72
63
22
18
59

Fewer than
About
1 case
1-3 cases
per year
per year

40%
37
37
39
22
23
29
37
37
28

20%
16
16
20
6
5
7
19
23
9

More than
3 cases
per year

15%
6
6
14
1
0.3
1
21
22
4

• In general, how often do the sources listed below refer potential corporate criminal
cases to your office for investigation or prosecution?

of the special strategies, compared to less
than 10 percent of their counterparts in
small districts.
• Special units and interagency networks
were more common in western and, to a
lesser extent, northeastern districts than in
midwestern or southern districts.

Cooperation with other
agencies
Jointly coordinated investigations are an
integral part of networking. Local prosecutors reported collaborating most often with
local police and State regulatory agencies
on joint investigations of corporate crimes
(table 5).
• The highest number, 38 percent, reported working with local police on one or
more corporate cases annually.
• Twenty-eight percent said they worked
with State regulatory agencies on one or
more corporate cases each year.
• At least once a year, more than 20 percent of prosecutors worked with the State
attorney general's office and State police.
• Almost 20 percent of prosecutors cooperated with another jurisdiction at least
once a year.

Joint investigations with Federal agencies
were rare. Less than 10 percent of the
respondents said they worked with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
U.S. Attorney's Office, or a Federal regulatory agency as often as once a year. In
three out of five offices, prosecutors never
worked with these Federal agencies.
Some prosecutors interviewed during the
case study visits faulted Federal investigative agencies for not referring cases to
local officials. Although local prosecutors
recognized the need for Federal agencies to
focus on large cases, they believed that
some small, unpursued cases may have
had significant local impact. While acknowledging different priorities, the prosecutors believed that too many cases have
escaped enforcement. Better communication between Federal and local officials
could provide prosecutors with leads to
pursue local cases not pursued by Federal
agencies.
However, despite growing recognition of
the seriousness of corporate crime and
widespread knowledge that traditional
methods of law enforcement are inadequate, the development of coordinated,
multistrategy responses from Federal,
State, and local governments remains more
an ideal than a reality.

4

Before deciding to proceed with a corporate case, prosecutors reported they considered many factors, including the type of
offense, resources available, actions of
other agencies, preferences of victims, and
potential impact of the prosecution on the
local community. Some of these factors
limited the prosecutor's willingness to
proceed with a corporate prosecution,
while others increased it.
Factors that limited prosecution. The
most important factors limiting local prosecution of corporate crimes were inadequate resources, legal constraints, and
availability of alternative remedies.
• Seventy percent of the survey respondents were less willing to prosecute if State
or Federal regulatory agencies had already
acted in a case.
• About 60 percent stated they probably
would limit their willingness to prosecute
if personnel were insufficient.
• More than 50 percent said they would
be less willing to prosecute if victims were
not cooperative or if criminal intent was
difficult to establish in a corporate context.
The inadequacies of resources at the local
level became apparent during visits to the
case study sites. Even in relatively large
well-to-do offices, prosecutors often did
not have basic equipment. For example,
prosecutors in one of the largest districts
lamented that they did not have dictaphones and that memorandums, briefs, and
other documents had to be written in longhand before office secretaries could type
them.
An investigator in the same district pointed
out that a car phone and an answering
machine would greatly improve her efficiency and productivity, enabling her to
receive and return calls as she traveled
around the city working her cases. Without
a phone, her time in the car was, as she put
it, "mostly wasted." She and other interviewees noted that these items are standard
equipment in all but the smallest private
law firms.

On a more substantive level, prosecutors in
one district commented that their ability t(
develop and dispose of environmental

:ases was seriously diminished by the lack
uf access to adequate laboratory facilities.
For example, delays in identifying potentially toxic substances limited the prosecutors' options in responding to cases of
illegal disposal or handling of toxic wastes.
As one prosecutor explained, to "fmd out
what's in a substance 6 months later is too
late in an environmental case. How can
you walk in [to a court) and [ask] for injunctive relief and say there's an immediate need to close this [business] down
when you've waited 6 months? How can
you do anything criminally-and talk
about how bad this is-if our office lets it
go 6 months at a time?''
Factors that increased prosecution. The
factors most likely to increase a prosecutor's willingness to proceed against a corporate wrongdoer involved the nature of
the offense and the characteristics of the
offender. More than 90 percent of the
respqndents indicated they would be more
willing to prosecute cases that involved the
following:
• Physical harm to victims.
• Evidence of multiple offenses.
• Large numbers of victims.
• Substantial economic harm.
Only slightly less important were the
education and deterrence functions of
prosecution. More than 85 percent said the
"need to deter other potential corporate
offenders" would increase their willingness
to prosecute. About 75 percent felt similarly about the "need to demonstrate
publicly that the law applies equally to all
offenders."

In contrast, 40 percent of the respondents
ranked deterrence of other offenders as the
most important objective in pursuing corporate crimes. In the view of one experienced prosecutor:
There's only one advantage to corporate prosecutions-in terms of its
deterrence value, one prosecution is
worth 500. I've prosecuted maybe
50 murderers, and I've never deterred a street murderer. I've probably prosecuted one industrial
murderer, and I think we've deterred
a whole lot of people-at least woke
them up-so some people are trying
to do the right thing. So even with a
lack of resources, one corporate
prosecution is much more valuable
than one street crime prosecution.
Addressing the same issue, another
prosecutor commented on environmental
crime:
Everybody agrees that criminal
prosecution is the big hammer on
environmental people. The proof is
how loud they squeal when you file
the case, and boy, do they squeal.
'Despite the supposed moral neutrality of
many corporate offenses, a notable proportion of prosecutors felt that corporate offenders deserve to be punished. Indeed, 35
percent ranked retribution as either the first
or second most important objective in a

ferent goals when prosecuting corporate as
opposed to ordinary street crimes. In the
case of a traditional street crime committed
by an individual, the most important objective for local prosecutors tended to be
either deterrence or incapacitation.
• About 33 percent of the respondents
rated incapacitation or deterrence of the
offender as the most important objective in
lJrosecuting ordinary street crimes.
~ Orily 16 percent rated deterrence of
other street criminals as the most important
objective in this type of case.

Most of the prosecutors interviewed at the
case study sites echoed these opinions,
arguing that corporate offenders were more
easily deterred than ordinary street offenders. Furthermore, prosecutors expressed a
strong sense of moral outrage over the
"arrogance" and "callousness" of many
business offenders, particularly those involved in repeated and intentional violations. For these offenders, the impositidn
of criminal sanctions for the sake of deterrence and retribution was regarded as
appropriate, necessary, and deserved.

The prosecutor as
problem solver
While acknowledging the importance of
convicting and punishing the guilty, some
prosecutors interviewed at the case study
sites articulated a broader concept of their
role in the criminal process. In their view,
the prosecutor's central function is reduction of criminal activity; deterrence is not
merely a hoped-for byproduct of the punishment process. So, rather than devote
themselves exclusively to the development
of prosecutable cases, these prosecutors
attempt to control criminal activity through
alternative means, an approach that has
been called "the prosecutor as problem

Table 5. Frequency of Joint Investigations With Selected Agencies*
Frequency

Goals of prosecution
In general, district attorneys pursued dif-

corporate crime conviction. In contrast,
less than 10 percent ranked retribution as
the most important objective in prosecuting street criminals.

Agency

Never

Local police
State police
State attorney general
State regulatory agency
Federal regulatory agency
U.S. Attorney's Office
FBI
Another prosecutor

29%
45
39
35
70
67
61
44

Fewer than
1 case
per year

About
1-3 cases
per year

More than
3 cases
per year

33%
33
39
36
23
26
29
35

22%
16
16
16
6
6
7
18

16%
7
5
12
2
3
3

* How often does your office cooperate on joint investigations of corporate crimes with
the agencies listed below?
5

solver."5 Although it was more the exception than the rule, the case studies uncovered evidence that such an approach is not
uncommon among local prosecutors.
For example, this strategy was used in a
case involving a well-respected corporation that had violated a State law governing the transportation and disposal of toxic
materials. Although there was enough
evidence to pursue a criminal indictment,
the prosecutor elected not to file charges.
Instead, he negotiated an agreement in
which the corporation paid a substantial
civil fine, donated money to a local hazardous waste project, and reimbursed the
entire cost of the investigation. The money
from the civil fme was used to fund a
conference on environmental problems for
law enforcement and regulatory officials.
In this case, the prosecutor believed that
this approach both educated and deterred
other potential offenders, while the conference fostered environmental awareness
among local officials. Preventing other
corporate environmental violations took
precedence here over enforcing the law
against a particular offender.

Policy implications
In dealing with corporate offenders, local

prosecutors often fmd themselves competing with well-fmanced and well-staffed
law frrms with vast fmancial and personnel resources, which can put up stiff legal
obstacles for prosecutors to overcome.
The effort is often expensive and timeconsuming, especially for prosecutors who
have limited staff and are facing these
challenges for the first time. The following
ideas on consolidating resources may be
worthy of exploration.

Sharing information. Local prosecutors
cited a need for a centralized information
clearinghouse and brief bank to allow
prosecutors to benefit from the collective
knowledge and experience of their colleagues nationwide. For example, prosecutors in small communities could draw on
the experience and wisdom of prosecutors
in large urban centers. Such a clearinghouse could also contain information on
alternative sanctions, innovative sentencing, and other enforcement techniques. It
would be especially useful in relatively
new areas of prosecution such as environmen~ and workplace-related crimes.
Automation. The potential of computers
to coordinate work among investigators in
different agencies could be more fully
explored. Agencies often have cases stored
in a computer data base, but have no way
of knowing what cases other agencies are
working on. A centralized computer data
bank might be particularly useful to local
prosecutors in situations involving certain
types of financial fraud or in cases in
which victims are located in widely scattered areas and offenders are mobile.
Many law enforcement agencies now use
computers for record keeping and case
management. These computer files could
tell investigators when someone in their
own agency is working on a particular
case, thus reducing duplication of effort
and facilitating information sharing.

Computer networks. Some prosecutors
and investigators suggested that a local
computer network linking agencies could
provide access to a common data base of
ongoing investigations and cases. The data
base entries could contain information on
the investigator (for example; name, telephone number, and agency) and informa-
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tion on the case (for example, victims,
suspects, and modus operandi). Investigators could use this data base to obtain both
information on the case and the name of
the investigator to coordinate activities.
Such a network would be particularly
useful in large urban areas where multiple
agencies in different jurisdictions often
work in geographical proximity.
Many technical details would require careful consideration. For example, when a
computer network is installed, files would
need to be protected so that only the investigator entering a case into the data base
could alter information pertaining to it; ,
other investigators would need appropriate
security clearances to read a file without
altering it.

Regional laboratories. Regional laboratories to serve multiple local jurisdictions
would make economic sense for hardpressed prosecutors, and the feasibility of
setting up such laboratories to analyze
chemical and environmental evidence
should be explored. These laboratories
could analyze and identify chemical
samples quickly, thus enabling local prosecutors to respond to cases that Federal
agencies may deem too small or too local
in impact to pursue.
Publicizing of prosecutions. Finally, local
prosecutors and other law enforcement
agencies could take advantage of heightened public concern over corporate crime
by publicizing their prosecutions of such
offenses. The public needs to hear that
local prosecutors regard these crimes as
serious and to learn how to identify and
report them. Ultimately, effective law
enforcement depends on the support of
concerned citizens who are willing to
become involved.

otes
1. Corporate crime is a form of white-

collar crime. The distinctive feature of
corporate crime is that the offense is committed primarily for the benefit of an ongoing legitimate business enterprise, rather
than for the individual who carries out the
offense.
2. The sample was drawn from a mailing
list provided by the National District Attorneys Association. Districts were classified
as urban if they were located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), as defmed
by the U.S. Census Bureau.
3. Data were abstracted from the County

and City Data Book (1988), Files on Diskette. U.S. Bureau of the Census.
4. A multiple regression analysis not discussed in this Brief confirmed the importance of resources, community context,
and regional location in determining levels

of activity against corporate crime. The
dependent variable in the regression analysis was a scale measuring the overall level
of activity against corporate crime. To
construct the scale, the prosecutors' responses to the question on how often the
office typically prosecutes the selected
corporate crimes (see table 2) were assigned ordinal ranks and summed. The
independent variables were number of
attorneys, presence of a special unit, level
of retail employment, and region. All of
the independent variables exerted statistically significant effects and collectively
explained 40 percent of the variance in the
activity scale.
5. Goldstock, R., 1991. "The Prosecutor as

Problem Solver." Occasional Paper from
the Center for Research in Crime and
Justice, X. New York University School of
Law.
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